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Abstract 1 
Objectives: The purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive capabilities of 2 
sportspersonship, moral competence, and emotional intelligence on cooperation in varying 3 
competitive conditions. Design: An experimental study was conducted, examining responses in a 4 
prisoner’s dilemma game with manipulated conditions. Method: Forty-three participants were 5 
randomly assigned to an accumulative or competitive condition, in which they contested 10 6 
rounds of choosing to cooperate or defect. Results: Whether the condition was accumulative or 7 
competitive did not significantly predict cooperation. In the final round of each contest however, 8 
cooperation was significantly reduced. Sportspersonship predicted a significant amount of 9 
cooperation percentage, while final round cooperation was predicted by emotional intelligence. 10 
Conclusions: Cooperation is in part determined by individual levels of sportspersonship in all 11 
conditions except when actions are free of future consequence. In such conditions, emotional 12 
intelligence appears to be a stronger indicator of cooperation. The implications of the study are 13 
that researchers and practitioners should consider how to develop sportspersonship and 14 
emotional intelligence to boost cooperation in various domains. 15 
 16 
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competence, and emotional intelligence 2 
 3 
Cooperation is essential for ensuring that individuals are able to work together to 4 
maximise individual and team performance in a variety of domains. Despite this, research into 5 
the personal characteristics beyond the Big 5 personality traits that predict cooperation is 6 
relatively scarce. Simpson’s paradox (1951) refers to findings demonstrating that most 7 
participants choose to cooperate more than defect in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Flood, 1952), 8 
despite that to defect is more fruitful (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). There are several competing 9 
explanations for observed cooperation. Chater, Vlaev, and Grinberg (2008) explain that people 10 
will continue to cooperate because of the higher average payoff. Two further competing 11 
explanations include strong reciprocity and evolutionary legacy perspective. Strong reciprocity 12 
(e.g., Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Gintis, 2000) suggests that a social norm evolves whereby 13 
cooperation is expected and therefore adhered to. In trying to extract the determinants of 14 
cooperation, Yang, Li, and Zheng (2013) found that reciprocity, perceived control, and risk 15 
taking all accounted for a relatively equal proportion of variance. 16 
The strong reciprocity explanation has been vehemently rejected by some researchers. 17 
Burnham and Johnson (2005) and Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) suggest that the only real 18 
explanation for electing to cooperate is because they have not truly understood the game. 19 
Rather, they propose that evolutionary legacy hypothesis means behavioural anomalies are 20 
caused by human ancestral and modern conditions, whereby conserved brain systems misfire 21 
to motivate behaviour that are no longer relevant to a modern society (Burnham & Hare, 22 
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2007). This theory has received partial support from Kanazawa and Fontaine (2013), who 1 
found a positive correlation with general intelligence and defection. 2 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the extent to which participants 3 
cooperate or defect in a prisoner’s dilemma game under varying conditions, and how this was 4 
predicted by sportspersonship, moral competence, and EI. Research examining cooperation in 5 
sport settings is scarce. One would expect that an individual’s level of sportspersonship would 6 
likely pre-dispose them towards cooperative behavior, but this has not previously been 7 
empirically examined. To determine if sportspersonship is a meaningful predictor of 8 
cooperation, we identified two concepts that have previously been identified as predictors of 9 
cooperation and tested the extent to which sportspersonship was able to explain variance in 10 
cooperation over and above these. Specifically, we assessed emotional intelligence, which 11 
Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries (2007) reported as indicative of cooperation, and moral 12 
competence, which has been associated with cooperative moral decision making (Kutnick & 13 
Brees, 1982). 14 
 Participants took part in an accumulative condition, whereby prizes were awarded 15 
relative to total points accrued, or a competitive condition, whereby prizes were awarded relative 16 
to league table position. The final round of each contest presented a situation whereby there was 17 
no consequence. This represented the final round of a prisoner’s dilemma match against an 18 
opponent, where there is no opportunity for revenge tactics should a participant suffer from 19 
defection. We hypothesized the following: 20 
1. Participants cooperate more frequently in a cooperative condition than a competition 21 
condition 22 
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2. Sportspersonship, EI, and moral competence significantly predict cooperation in 1 
accumulative but not competitive conditions 2 
 We made no hypothesis regarding cooperation or the predictors of it in the final round of 3 
each contest. 4 
Methods 5 
Participants  6 
Forty-three participants (males = 32; females = 11) aged from 18 to 40 years (M = 20.33, 7 
SD = 3.60), who indicated that they participated in competitive team (n = 36) and individual (n = 8 
7) sports with an average playing experience of 10.86 years (SD = 6.07) volunteered to take part 9 
in the study. 10 
Measures  11 
Sportspersonship was measured using the 24-item compliant and principled 12 
sportspersonship scale (CAPSS; Perry et al., 2015). Subscales represent compliance towards 13 
officials, towards rules, not legitimising injurious acts, respect for opponent, and game 14 
perspective. Items are graded on a 4-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = strongly disagree 15 
and 4 = strongly agree. 16 
Trait EI was assessed using the 153-item trait emotional intelligence questionnaire 17 
(TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham, 2003), which includes 15 facets of EI and four higher-order 18 
factors; wellbeing, self-control, emotionality, and sociability. Participants are required to 19 
respond to each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = 20 
completely agree. 21 
Moral competence was assessed using the moral competence test (MCT; Lind, 1998, 22 
2008), which presents participants with two moral dilemmas. Each dilemma presents a short 23 
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background story culminating in a moral action. The participant must then indicate the extent 1 
to which they accept or reject (-3 = I strongly reject, +3 = I strongly accept) the action and six 2 
arguments supporting and six rejecting arguments the protagonist’s solution. Each argument 3 
presents a moral orientation aligned to Kohlberg’s stages of moralisation (1976). A moral 4 
judgement competence score (C-score; 1-100) is calculated as an individual’s total response 5 
variation. 6 
Procedure  7 
Following ethical approval from a higher education institution in the UK, data 8 
collection took part on four separate days, two of which were designated as accumulative, and 9 
two were competitive. In the accumulative condition, participants received three pence for 10 
every point they scored over the course of the day. In the competitive condition, the following 11 
award structure was used: First: £50, Second: £25, Third: £10. Those who finished outside of 12 
the top three places did not receive a prize. Points for cooperation (C) and defection (D) were 13 
awarded as follows: CvC: 3,3; DvD: 2,2; CvD: 1,4; DvC: 4,1. 14 
Between eight and 13 participants took part on each day. After providing informed 15 
consent and completing the psychometric measures, participants were assigned to separate 16 
holding rooms to ensure that they were not aware of their opponent. A round-robin tournament 17 
then took place. Each fixture consisted of 10 rounds, each requiring the participants to choose 18 
to cooperate or defect by holding up a card with a printed “C” or “D”, both visible to the lead 19 
researcher, would then read the results with appointed scores to both participants. In total, 20 
there were 218 fixtures of 10 rounds each and therefore 2180 rounds in total. Each day took 21 
approximately four hours to complete.  22 
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Data Analysis  1 
Analyses included screening data, conducting an independent-samples and paired-2 
samples t-test to test condition and tactical effects respectively, and bivariate correlations 3 
examined the strength of relationship between CAPSS subscales, EI, moral competence and 4 
cooperation in both conditions. To examine the predictive properties of condition and personal 5 
characteristics, cooperation was inserted as a dependent variable in a multiple linear regression 6 
model. Given the moderate sample size for type of analyses undertaken, post-hoc power 7 
analyses were conducted for each t-test and multiple regression and are reported as 1-β. 8 
Results 9 
Descriptive Statistics  10 
Tests for normality revealed no issues with skewness or kurtosis (< 2) for all dependent 11 
variables. Internal consistency reached satisfactory levels for all variables (α ≥ .70). There were 12 
no significant correlations with moral competence and any dimension from the CAPSS or the 13 
TEIQue. Correlations between sportspersonship and EI are presented in Table 1. To correct for 14 
type 1 error as a result of multiple comparisons in all statistical analyses, Benjamini-Hochberg q 15 
was derived from calculating the False Discovery Rate (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 16 
The null hypothesis was rejected if and only if p < q and the 95% confidence interval did not 17 
contain zero. The strength of the relationships between sportspersonship factors and emotionality 18 
was considered worthy of further exploration. Therefore, bivariate correlations were calculated 19 
between sportspersonship factors and the emotionality subscales. Relationships existed 20 
throughout the sportspersonship and emotionality correlation matrix but the largest relationships 21 
were found between emotionality factors and game perception. 22 
Hypothesis 1: Condition Effects  23 
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An independent-samples t-test examined the condition effects by testing for differences 1 
in all dependent variables in accumulative and competitive conditions. Sportspersonship, moral 2 
competence, and trait EI variables were included to screen for potential sampling effects. No 3 
significant differences indicated that results were not brought about by one group coincidentally 4 
obtaining individuals higher in sportspersonship, EI, or moral competence. The only significant 5 
difference between groups was in sociability (t(40) = 2.30, p < .05, d = .71, 1-β = .61). Contrary 6 
to the hypothesis, no significant differences were detected for cooperation between groups. 7 
However, there was a significant difference (t(28.20) = 2.85, p < .01, d = .87, 1-β = .79) in the 8 
final round, as cooperation was significantly higher in the accumulative condition. Similarly, 9 
those in the accumulative condition were significantly more likely to cooperate after being 10 
suckered in the previous round (t(37) = 2.52, p < .05, d = .79, 1-β = .71) than participants in the 11 
competitive condition. Overall, a greater proportion of the total points available were achieved in 12 
the accumulative condition than the competitive condition (t(27.21) = 4.50, p < .001, d = 1.43, 1-13 
β > .99). A paired samples t-test to examine the condition effects between the first round 14 
cooperation and final round cooperation revealed a large significant difference (t(42) = 8.74, p < 15 
.001, d = 2.67, 1-β > .99). 16 
Hypothesis 2: Sportspersonship, EI, and Moral Competence Effects  17 
Clear positive correlations between sportspersonship subscales and the overall 18 
percentage of cooperation were evident, with all correlations significant except compliance 19 
towards rules (Table 2). Although there was a trend to suggest a positive relationship between 20 
sportspersonship and first round cooperation, there was not enough certainty to reject the null 21 
hypotheses. There was no relationship between sportspersonship and cooperation after being 22 
suckered. Moral competence correlated positively with cooperation but only significantly so 23 
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with first round cooperation. EI was positively correlated with cooperation in the final round. 1 
The clearest relationship between cooperation and EI was on the emotionality subscale, which 2 
as identified earlier, is most closely linked to sportspersonship.  3 
To test the predictive capabilities of sportspersonship, moral competence, and EI 4 
effects, while controlling for condition effects, we examined a linear multiple regression 5 
model. The condition was entered at Step 1, moral competence and trait EI were entered at 6 
Step 2, and sportspersonship was entered at Step 3 to determine the variance predicted by it 7 
over and above other variables. In total, four regression models were examined (Table 3) with 8 
overall, first round, final round cooperation as the dependent variables presenting a significant 9 
effect after step 3 (cooperation percentage: F(4, 37) = 5.44, p < .01, R2 = .37, p < .01, 1-β > 10 
.99; first round: F(4, 37) = 2.64, p < .05, R2 = .22, p < .05, 1-β > .99; final round: F(4, 37) = 11 
4.87, p < .01, R2 = .35, p < .01, 1-β > .99). The condition had no effect on overall or first round 12 
cooperation, but explained a significant amount of variance in the final round cooperation 13 
(F(1, 40) = 7.51, p < .01, R2 = .16, p < .01, β = -.45, 1-β = .73). Moral competence explained 14 
some variance in first round (β = .27) cooperation, but not with enough certainty to reject the 15 
null hypothesis. Trait EI explained significant variance in final round cooperation (β = .43), 16 
and sportspersonship explained a significant proportion of variance in overall cooperation (β = 17 
.54). 18 
Discussion  19 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the predictive capabilities of 20 
sportspersonship, moral competence, and EI on cooperation in varying competitive conditions. 21 
The results indicated that these characteristics had a greater influence on the cooperation than 22 
situation factors, with the exception of when responding to being suckered. Essentially, in 23 
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accumulative and moderately competitive conditions, cooperation is reasonably well predicted 1 
by sportspersonship. However, in a situation where there is no future consequence, EI is the 2 
greatest predictor. It appears that emotionality is the gateway towards understanding cooperation 3 
in such circumstances. 4 
It was notable that the condition had no effect on overall or first round cooperation. This 5 
suggests that the extent to which the situation is competitive does not influence how people 6 
approach it, but it does impact on how they respond to events during competition. In first round 7 
cooperation, moral competence, EI, and sportspersonship all predicted a statistically insignificant 8 
amount of variance. However, in the final round of each game, emotional intelligence became 9 
the key indicator. This suggests that moral decision-making is governed more by how people 10 
engage with emotion when, at least in competitive game scenarios, they are in a vulnerable 11 
position. 12 
Sportspersonship, moral competence, and EI are complex psychological structures, 13 
requiring a level of reflection that demonstrates sophisticated cognitive functioning. They are 14 
also all positively associated with cooperation. This result, plus the finding that cooperation 15 
deteriorates with competition, questions Burnham and Hare’s (2007) suggestion that 16 
cooperation is a lack of understanding of the situation, although the increased reliance upon EI 17 
in the final round could be construed as indicative of logical misfiring. The significance of 18 
empathy means that the concept of strong reciprocity (Fehr & Gintis, 2007), is a seemingly 19 
plausible explanation of cooperation in the final round. 20 
This study was able to predict substantive variance in cooperation, however, it does 21 
have some limitations. Firstly, the data collection procedure required approximately four hours 22 
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of participant time, which reduced the potential for a large sample. It also used a fairly 1 
homogenous sample in terms of age. 2 
This study has implications for enhancing cooperation. By improving sportspersonship, 3 
for which Perry, Clough, and Crust (2013) provide some applied recommendations, we can 4 
enhance cooperation. Researchers specifically interested in cooperation should strive to 5 
examine the role of emotionality more specifically, empathy in competitive conditions. 6 
In sum, the condition was only an indicator of cooperation when participants were 7 
responding to a change in situation, sportspersonship is a significant predictor of cooperation 8 
generally and emotion is a key indicator of cooperation in extremely competitive 9 
circumstances.  10 
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Table 1.  1 
Bivariate correlations between sportspersonship and trait EI factors 2 
Variable  Officials Rules Injurious Acts Opponent Game Perspective Sportspersonship 
Emotional Intelligence 
Wellbeing -.16 (-.47, .19) -.26 (-.49, .01) -.06 (-.36, .26) -.16 (-.46, .17) -.20 (-.43, .02) -.18 (-.47, .13) 
Self-control .17 (-.17, .51) -.03 (-.37, .30) .05 (-.29, .39) .00 (-.39, .42) .12 (-.21, .43) .10 (-.27, .46) 
Emotionality .45* (.13, .68)1 .39 (.10, .62)1 .46* (.12, .77)1 .38 (.09, .59)1 .59* (.35, .77)1 .55* (.25, .77)1 
Sociability -.05 (-.38, .24) -.19 (-.48, .10) -.24 (-.50, .04) -.05 (-.37, .28) -.18 (-.48, .11) -.16 (-.45, .13) 
Global EI .12 (-.21, .42) -.08 (-.33, .17) .05 (-.27, .38) .06 (-.25, .38) .06 (-.21, .32) .07 (-.26, .37) 
Emotionality subscale 
Emotion perception .18 (-.14, .49) .09 (-.20, .38) .17 (-.17, .50) .08 (-.23, .36) .32* (.01, .63)1 .22 (-.15, .54) 
Emotion expression .40* (.11, .63)1 .34 (.08, .57)1 .31 (.00, .61)1 .24 (-.05, .48) .37* (.14, .56)1 .40* (.14, .62)1 
Trait empathy .31 (.04, .52)1 .29 (-.05, .54) .38 (.12, .61)1 .32 (.04, .56)1 .46* (.21, .66)1 .42* (.18, .63)1 
Relationships .25 (-.01, .50) .24 (-.08, .52) .34 (.06, .60)1 .33 (.04, .58)1 .40* (.07, .65)1 .38* (.08, .64)1 
*Statistically significant at p < q. 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals are presented in parentheses 3 
1Confidence interval does not contain zero. 4 
  5 
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Table 2. 1 
Pearson correlation coefficients for sportspersonship and cooperation  2 
Variable  % cooperation First round cooperation 
Final round 
cooperation 
Cooperation 
after suckered 
Officials  .52* (.30, .69)1 .33 (.00 .61)1 .10 (-.19, .37) .23 (-.13, .59) 
Rules  .25 (-.04, .51)  .14 (-.14, .43) .12 (-.23, .41) .00 (-.31, .31) 
Injurious acts  .43* (.17, .63)1 .16 (-.11, .43) .21 (-.15, .49) .03 (-.35, .38) 
Opponent  .43* (.17, .62)1 .15 (-.21, .45) .11 (-.30, .49) -.03 (-.46, .37) 
Game perspective  .45* (.16, .68)1 .20 (-.11, .57) .12 (-.33, .50) .00 (-.38, .45) 
Sportspersonship  .51* (.26, .70)1 .25 (-.06, .53) .16 (-.26, .50) .08 (-.35, .45) 
Moral competence  .29 (-.02, .65) .36 (.10, .62)1 .17 (-.09, .47) .16 (-.12, .49) 
Wellbeing  .18 (-.18, .53) .03 (-.32, .38) .33 (.03, .57)1 .20 (-.13, .51) 
Self-control  .20 (-.18, .53) .21 (-.13, .53) .34 (-.02, .67) .23 (-.17, .60) 
Emotionality  .60* (.39, .78)1 .57* (.35, .75)1 .40 (.12, .62)1 .32 (.02, .58)1 
Sociability  -.02 (-.39, .29) -.01 (-.36, .30) .24 (-.03, .47) .27 (-.03, .53) 
Global EI  .32 (-.01, .60) .31 (-.01, .57) .51* (.18, .72)1 .40 (.05, .66)1 
*Statistically significant at p < q. 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals are presented in parentheses 3 
1Confidence interval does not contain zero. 4 
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Table 3.  1 
Predictors of cooperation 2 
*Statistically significant ΔR2 at p < .05, **p < .01. 3 
1Confidence interval does not contain zero. 4 
 5 
 B (95% CI) SE B β t p R2 
Dependent variable = Cooperation percentage 
Step 1      .01 
Condition -.27 (-17.09, 16.57) 8.33 -.01 -.03 .98  
Step 2      .09 
Moral competence .34 (-.26, .94) .30 .18 1.16 .26  
Trait EI 17.60 (-5.71, 40.92) 11.52 .24 1.53 .14  
Step 3      .37** 
Sportspersonship 26.96 (13.41, 40.50)1 6.68 .54 4.03 < .001  
Dependent variable = First round cooperation 
Step 1      .00 
Condition 4.05 (-17.19, 25.30) 10.51 .06 .39 .70  
Step 2      .15 
Moral competence .63 (-.10, 1.37) .36 .27 1.75 .09  
Trait EI 23.84 (-4.79, 52.47) 14.14 .26 1.69 .10  
Step 3      .22 
Sportspersonship 17.90 (-1.14, 36.94) 9.40 .28 1.91 .07  
Dependent variable = Final round cooperation 
Step 1      .16** 
Condition -22.07 (-38.34, -5.80)1 8.05 -.40 -2.74 < .01  
Step 2      .30** 
Moral competence .22 (-.33, .78) .27 .11 .83 .42  
Trait EI 34.81 (12.66, 56.96)1 10.89 .43 3.20 < .01  
Step 3      .35 
Sportspersonship 11.20 (-3.35, 25.75) 7.18 .21 1.56 .13  
Dependent variable = Cooperation after suckered 
Step 1      .04 
Condition -9.92 (-25.72, 5.88) 7.82 -.20 -2.23 .21  
Step 2      .13 
Moral competence .14 (-.42, .70) .28 .08 .50 .62  
Trait EI 20.41 (-1.48, 42.29) 10.81 .29 1.89 .07  
Step 3      .14 
Sportspersonship 3.87 (-11.32, 19.07) 7.50 .08 .52 .61  
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